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During the mid-fifteenth century C.E. (mid-ninth century Hijri), the attacks of the Spanish and Portuguese against Morocco's coastal cities marked the internal weakness of Marinid rule. Iberian crusades were part of a larger campaign to cut off support for the last remaining Muslim strongholds in Iberia (especially Granada) and to channel the trade of gold and spices into Iberian hands. The campaigns began with the surprise assault on Sebtā (Ceuta) organized in 1415 C.E. by Prince Henry the Navigator. Within a week, Iberian forces captured the port city, killing or expelling all its inhabitants. But the conquest of Sebtā did not provide the means of dominating trade routes from interior Africa and India that the Portuguese had hoped. Muslim merchants boycotted Sebtā, and local tribes, often joined by Muslim "irregulars" (called *mujāhidīn* by those who supported the cause) tried to retake the city. Faced with such resistance, the Portuguese were compelled to conquer all the ports on the Moroccan coasts, both Mediterranean and Atlantic. Within a century, all the major ports with the exception of Tangier had fallen to Portuguese control. The response of the Marinid dynasty to successive assaults by Iberian forces was weak. Muslim "irregulars" had put up a defense of Sebtā without Marinid support, but failed to retake the city. The regent Abū Zakarīyā Yahyā al-Wattāsī supported the defense of Tangier again, but only to make a show of symbolic resistance to the Portuguese while negotiating for a peace that would allow them to quell internal dissent and prop up their state.<sup>50</sup>

Such an opportunistic policy led to increasing discontent among Moroccan political thinkers, including jurists and Sufis. Moroccans had grown used to seeing Iberia itself as a zone of war and conflict, but the southern shore of the Mediterranean had seemed like an inviolable zone of safety, symbolized by the term *Dār al-Islām*. The fall of Sebtā sparked a widespread call for *jihād*. The Marinid state itself was incapable of organizing such campaigns, so the responsibility for *jihād* devolved onto the sharifian clans and Sufi communities. The call for *jihād* against Iberians therefore became an indirect call to oust the Marinids.

The Qādirīyya community in Fes participated in this political response. In addition to advocating a new model of saintly authority within Fes, they also preached the necessity of *jihād* against the Spanish and Portuguese invaders. The clearest example of this is the poetry of Muḥammad ibn Yaggabsh al-Tāzī, who urged his fellow Muslims to join in the fight against the Iberian incursions along

the coasts of Morocco. In his *Kitāb al-Jihād*, he echoes Ibn Khaldūn that insecurity “has led to the loosening of social bonds and the erosion of solidarity.”<sup>51</sup>

The internal weakness of Muslim society aided the external threat from Portugal and Spain. Al-Tāzī played off the mounting panic resulting from the *reconquista*, which was resulting in more expulsions of Andalusian Muslims, as refugees to the urban centers of northern Morocco. “Are you not aware that your enemies are investigating you and are employing every stratagem to get at you? They have gathered together in numbers too large to count, and they have sent their spies and scouts to every land in order to inform themselves of your numbers, as well as your strength and convictions.”<sup>52</sup> The list of reasons that al-Tāzī constructs to explain this decay is generic, including greed, wine drinking, and other stock moralisms. What is unusual is that at the end of the list he blames “the tyrannical ruler” (*al-sulṭān al-jāʿir*) for causing such weakness.<sup>53</sup> In this way, his moral criticism of common Muslims led to criticism against the Marinid rulers and their Waṭṭāsīd ministers, and he urged them to reform.

Neither the Marinid and Waṭṭāsīd families had no direct claim to religious legitimacy nor to the rule.

There is earlier evidence of Qādirī agitation in favor of *jihād* from within the capital of Fes beyond the eloquent and fiery poetry of al-Tāzī. In addition to his preaching quick, miraculous vigilante justice, Zarruq’s friend Al-Amīn was preaching to the public against the Iberian incursions on the Moroccan coast and preaching *jihād*. Zarruq tells how al-Amīn generated a public uproar about a suspected (Andalusī) spy in the midst of Fes around 865 Hijri (1461–62 C.E.). “He confronted an Andalusian in Fes who was presumably a refugee from the *reconquista* and claimed descent from the Prophet’s family. He said, ‘You are not satisfied with just being a Muslim, but go about claiming a noble genealogy!’ In fact most likely you are a spy [for the Spanish or Portuguese]!”<sup>54</sup>

By making such an accusation, al-Amīn was playing with fire. Many in Fes were suspicious of the Andalusian refugees and questioned the sincerity of those who converted to Islam. Many also resented the technical skills of the refugees and their success in finding patronage from the Marinid court.<sup>55</sup> The denunciation and squabble escalated until the minister of state, ‘Alī ibn ‘Abd al-Waṭṭāsī, interceded to end the affair. He favored the Andalusian and called on al-Amīn to be isolated that the Sufi presence in court and subject to a

be carried out (inciting gossip that he had committed suicide). The Andalusian returned suddenly to Spanish soil, and some of his associates leaked the information that he really had been spying for the Christians. By then, al-Amīn had already died, a “martyr” (*shahīd*) for the cause of resentment against the Marinid rulers and public frenzy over the need to protect Morocco against Iberian invasion. This was also the first moment when the Qādirīs in Fes openly, though obliquely, protested against Marinid rule. By advocating *jihād* against the Iberians and questioning the legitimacy of Marinid rule, the Qādirīs allied with other Sufi movements outside Fes. The strongest of these was the movement headed by the charismatic Sufi leader Muḥammad ibn Sulaymān al-Jazūlī.<sup>57</sup> Al-Jazūlī combined rural traditions of Sufi activism with urban traditions of learned piety to fashion a new kind of spiritual path. This path set up the “axial saint” as the leader of a mass movement which aimed at the reform of rural life and the exercise of political power. Al-Jazūlī accepted disciples in vast numbers, without educational conditions and without insisting on a long period of personal training under his supervision.<sup>58</sup> In contrast to the Qādirī Sufis, al-Jazūlī encouraged his followers to visit the tombs of Moroccan saints only, rather than to travel east toward Cairo and the *Ḥijāz*. In cultivating a sense of local allegiance and cultural particularity, al-Jazūlī put himself forward as the saintly leader of Morocco, and he used the term *imām* to describe his authority.

Al-Jazūlī was allegedly a *sharīf*, and his method of contemplation focused heavily upon blessing the spirit of the Prophet, his own purported ancestor.<sup>59</sup> Indeed, he claimed that nobility resided in the descendants of the Prophet, implying that political authority should reside in them as well, for the most noble should naturally rule. “One is great because of the greatness of nobility and lineage. I am noble in lineage. My ancestor is the Messenger of God (may God bless and preserve him) and I am nearer to him than all of God’s creation. My reputation is eternal, dyed in gold and silver. Oh you who desire gold and silver, follow us, for he who follows us dwells in the heights of *‘Ilīyyin* in this world and the hereafter!”<sup>60</sup> Al-Jazūlī used terms reminiscent of Shi‘i thought to describe himself as an inerrant spiritual guide, “an intermediary between yourselves and True One.”<sup>61</sup> He often referred to himself as *khalīfa*, exciting millenarian hopes among his listeners who may have expected him to lead a political revolution from his position of spiritual authority.<sup>62</sup>

Al-Jazūlī clearly saw political discontent as the fuel that kept his claim to spiritual leadership of all of Morocco burning bright. Yet he tried to focus this discontent into constructive channels: the reform of rural society, the spread of basic literacy and religious education, and the military defense of Moroccan ports against Iberian incursions. Al-Jazūlī was one of the strongest preachers of *jihād* in the countryside and coastal areas. His own aspiration to become a socially active and politically potent saint seems to have come into sharp focus as he participated in the *jihād* to defend Tangier (along with other Sufi colleagues and sharifian nobles) in 841 Hijri (1437–38 C.E.). Later, he encouraged his body of 12,000 followers

not only to engage in spiritual devotions, but also to form an irregular army to assist in the *jihād* to compensate for lack of government campaigns.

Cornell cites fascinating evidence to illustrate how al-Jazūlī combined the forms of Qādirī devotions in building an ostensibly Shādhilī community. He is reported to have kept company with Qādirī Sufis in Egypt and learned from them the various forms of invoking blessing upon the Prophet. After his return to Morocco, he did not seem to have had intimate contact with the Qādirīs of Fes. Nevertheless, the Qādirīyya community in Fes and the movement headed by al-Jazūlī or his followers eventually converged, for both preached the need for *jihād* against the Iberian Muslims. This elevated the prestige of sharifian families as political actors and leaned toward rising up against the Marinid state if it opposed the social mobilization.

However, the question of the relationship between the Qādirīs in urban Morocco and the followers of al-Jazūlī is open to speculation. Some argue that followers of al-Jazūlī were involved in political activities against the Marinids in Fes itself.<sup>63</sup> However, evidence for this strong thesis is lacking. There was no zawiya affiliated with the Jazūlī community in Fes until after the rise of the movement and the death of al-Jazūlī, when his primary successor, ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz al-Jazūlī, founded a zawiya there.<sup>64</sup> Others speculate about the possibility of “a strong influence” of al-Jazūlī upon Qādirīs in this period.<sup>65</sup> Such an influence

partnership between Qādirīs and followers of al-Jazūlī should not be projected back in time to a period when the Marinid hold on power would have made such open associations dangerous. It is more accurate to assert that different Sufi communities shared the common hope that a sharifian leader would capture power through *jihād* propaganda. The Qādirīyya community in the urban centers (especially in Fes) entertained this hope, as did the Jazūlīyya in rural centers (especially in southern Morocco). The commonality of certain rhetoric or doctrines arose due to the congruent political aspirations of these groups. This commonality does not prove the existence of a formal political alliance or even sustained personal contact between these Sufi communities. It is not clear that the Qādirīs developed any complex ideology of religious leadership comparable to that developed by al-Jazūlī and elaborated by his later followers. The Qādirīs may have felt that any just ruler, especially from among the *shurafāʾ*, should replace the corrupt Marinid dynasty and reunite the Muslims of Morocco in a *jihād*. When al-Jazūlī's followers came to Fes, they naturally gravitated toward the Qādirī zawiya as a meeting place, since they had no opportunity to build their own zawiya in this period. The first mention of al-Jazūlī's followers in Fes occurred after his death, when Ahmad Zarruq met two prominent followers of al-Jazūlī who visited Zawiya Bū'l-Quṭūb.<sup>66</sup>

It is crucial to note the relation of the Qādirī Sufis with other Sufi movements that advocated *jihād* and open opposition to the Marinid sultan. Zarruq's precarious

position in Fes is intimately connected to the activities of the Qādirīs. The balance Zarruq enjoyed in his youth (between spiritual cultivation with juridical Sufis and spiritual exploration with Qādirī Sufis) was toppled when Qādirī saints supported a sharifian revolution. This crucial event in Zarruq's life can only be understood if the Qādirī community's political agenda is carefully distinguished from that of the Jazūlīyya movement that was to dominate Morocco in later periods.



The *sharīf* al-ʿImrānī proceeded to set up a new “republic” in which the ruled as the rightful and just leaders of the Muslim community. Although not possess written records of their new ideology of political power, it seems they dispensed with the position of sultan and minister of state.<sup>89</sup> The substance of their new ideology is evident in the aftermath of the revolution. On hearing of the overthrow of the Marinid sultan, the Wattāsī family sought to return to the rightful rulers. They expected the *sharīf* and his supporters to welcome them since they had previously championed themselves as ruling on behalf of the sultan as their patrons and protectors. However, the *sharīf* refused the Wattāsī family their military forces entry into the city; after a tussle, the Wattāsī family expelled their forces in the garrison town just beyond the city walls and cut off the Wattāsī sharifian republic from access to the countryside.

Within Fes, the *sharīf* and his son ruled for six years, showing that they controlled a following of religious notables and Sufis who rallied the people to their cause. In this support, the Qādirī community played a major role. The Qādirīs were involved in the intrigue that marked the beginning phases of the revolution. As mentioned above, al-Amīn rose to public controversy by denouncing al-Wattāsī (who was evidently close to the Wattāsī minister) as a Spanish spy withi-

also articulated a basis of legitimacy for the *sharīf*’s rule. They had already been experimenting with visionary initiations and the idea of total absorption in the personality of ʿAbd al-Qādir al-Jīlānī, a saint who was a *sharīf*. In addition, they cultivated a spiritual connection directly to the Prophet himself while garnering patronage from the Qādirī family of *shurafāʾ*. This mode of spiritual authority shared a reciprocal affinity with the al-Jūfī *sharīf*’s claim to political authority based on genealogical descent from the Prophet. This claim was that the descen-

dants carried the Prophet's own personal virtues, sense of justice, and right. Qādirī leaders forged this Sufi-sharifian alliance in Fes, in a similar way Jazūliyya community forged an alliance with the Saʿdian family of *shur* side of Fes.

The events of the revolution in Fes thrust the young Zarruq into the intrigue and public debate in a way that threatened to destroy his future in ideals clashed with political expediency. His budding maturity rested on a balance of patronage and juridical training in the madrasa and exploratio devotions and exercises under the care of two spirituals guides: al-Qūr Zaytūnī. The revolution destroyed any semblance of balance between thous forces and institutions. The revolution ruptured the cultural consen political rule and its religious legitimacy that had been in force since the b of Marinid rule, over two centuries before.

The revolution pitted Zarruq's two patrons, both of whom he look saints, against each other in a moment of political danger. His loyalty to o only be seen as betrayal of the other. In the months preceding the actual re Zarruq's colleagues in the Qādirī community began to intrigue against rule. Zarruq records that he accompanied al-Zaytūnī and others on the

Yiʿzza with our Shaykh al-Zaytūnī and a group of his disciples (*fuqarāʾ*). Intimate secrets were revealed to us, while illuminations and blessings came to us that could never be surpassed.... One day al-Zaytūnī said something about the two new servants of the sultan and commanded me to keep this secret for some days; and I did keep silent."<sup>90</sup>